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EMPLOYMENT LAW-THE FIFTH CIRCUIT'S SHAKY
LANDING PROHIBITS A HOSTILE WORK
ENVIRONMENT CLAIM UNDER USERRA FOR
PILOTS WITH MILITARY OBLIGATIONS
JENNIFER STATON*
T HE UNIFORMED Services Employment and Reemploy-
ment Rights Act (USERRA) protects military service mem-
bers from discrimination; yet in a case of first impression, the
Fifth Circuit recently held that USERRA did not provide mem-
bers of the U.S. Armed Forces Reserves or the Air National
Guard with a claim against their employer, Continental Airlines,
Inc. (Continental), for a hostile work environment.' This deci-
sion has a significant impact on the airline industry since mili-
tary veterans and reservists have long made up a meaningful
portion of commercial airline pilots, with some airlines report-
ing between 35-45%.2
The Fifth Circuit erred in its narrow interpretation of
USERRA in Carder v. Continental Airlines, Inc. because a hostile
work environment claim is consistent with legislative intent, Su-
preme Court precedent, and the language of the statute.
USERRA prohibits an employer from denying any "benefit of
employment" to a service member because of his or her military
service.' While district courts have varied in their interpreta-
* Jennifer Staton is a candidate for Juris Doctor, May 2013, at Southern
Methodist University Dedman School of Law. She received her B.A., magna cum
laude in 2008 from Duke University. The author wishes to express her gratitude
to her family and friends for their love and support.
1 Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA),
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (3) (2006); Carder v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 636 F.3d 172, 173
(5th Cir. 2011).
2 David Larter, Commercial Pilot Job Market Ready for a Boom, AIR FORCE TIMES
(July 22, 2011), http://www.airforcetimes.com/news/2011/07/air-force-com-
mercial-pilot-market-boom-07221 lw/ (about 45% of the 6,100 pilots at Southwest
Airlines are veterans or reservists and about 35% of the 600 pilots at Frontier
Airlines are veterans).
3 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).
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tions of USERRA,4 the Fifth Circuit concluded that the omission
of the phrase "terms, conditions, and privileges of employment"
(which appears in other antidiscrimination statutes) indicates
Congress purposefully excluded hostile work environment
claims from being actionable under the statute. 5 Thus, accord-
ing to the Fifth Circuit, a service member is only protected
under USERRA if the harassment results in denial of a contrac-
tual benefit or forces the employee to quit his or her job, result-
ing in a claim for constructive discharge, despite the statute's
explicit purpose of protecting service members from discrimina-
tion on the basis of their military service.6
The appellants in this case are pilots, who were members of
the U.S. Armed Forces Reserves and the Air National Guard,
employed by Continental.7 These pilots experienced various
forms of harassment regarding their military obligations, includ-
ing restrictions on military leave and attempts to cancel military
leave,8 denial and disapproval of military leave notices, and
phone calls to pilots' homes to question them about their mili-
tary leave.' In addition, Continental managers verbally harassed
pilots by making "derisive and derogatory comments" regarding
the pilots' military obligations." For example: "If you guys take
more than three or four days a month in military leave, you're
just taking advantage of the system;". "I used to be a guard guy,
so I know the scams you guys are running;" and "You need to
choose between [Continental] and the Navy."'"
In response to the conduct described above, the pilots filed a
class action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District
of Texas alleging multiple claims under USERRA. 12 The district
court partially granted Continental's 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
regarding the hostile work environment claim, holding that the
4 See Steenken v. Campbell Cnty., No. 04-224-DLB, 2007 WL 837173, at *3
(E.D. Ky. Mar. 15, 2007) (broadly construing the term "benefit of employment"
to include the right to be free from harassment in the workplace); Baerga-Castro
v. Wyeth Pharm., No. 08-1014 (GAG/JA), 2009 WL 2871148, at *12 (D.P.R. Sept.
3, 2009) (finding no claim for hostile work environment under USERRA).
5 Carder, 636 F.3d at 178.
6 Id. at 181-82; see 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (3).
7 Carder, 636 F.3d at 173.
8 Id. at 174.
9 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at *6, Carder, 636 F.3d 172 (5th Cir. 2011) (No.
10-1546), 2011 WL 2533824.
10 Carder, 636 F.3d at 174.
11 Id. (quotations omitted).
12 Id. at 173.
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plain meaning of the term "benefits of employment" does not
include freedom from harassment.'" The appellants filed an in-
terlocutory appeal on the question of whether USERRA pro-
vides for a hostile work environment claim, and the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit granted the appeal. 4
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the hostile work
environment claim, but asserted a different rationale. 5 Unlike
the district court, the Fifth Circuit did not conclude that the
plain language of the statute was clear-cut.' 6 On the contrary, a
direct conflict existed between the statute's stated purpose of
protecting service members from discrimination because of
their military service and the lack of reference to any form of
workplace harassment as a violation of the statute. 7 Thus, in
determining that USERRA does not provide a cause of action
for a hostile work environment, the court compared the lan-
guage used in USERRA to other antidiscrimination statutes and
looked to USERRA's legislative history and underlying policy
goals. 8 Although the court acknowledged that the legislative
history showed that Congress intended for the statute to be
broadly construed to prevent discrimination, it ultimately con-
cluded that the failure to include the phrase "terms, conditions,
or privileges of employment," as used in other antidiscrimina-
tion statutes, demonstrated Congress's clear intention to ex-
clude hostile work environment claims under USERRA."9 In
addition, the court found that the purpose of USERRA is to
'"encourage people to join the reserves"' and not to combat a
widespread social problem of discrimination and harassment
against military service members.2 °
In concluding that USERRA provides no cause of action for a
hostile work environment, the Fifth Circuit first identified and
analyzed the relevant sections of the statute.2 ' Section 4311 (a)
13 Id. at 173-74.
14 Id. at 174.
15 Id. at 182.
16 Id. at 176; see Carder v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., No. H-09-3173, 2009 WL
4342477, at *11 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 30, 2009).
17 Carder, 636 F.3d at 176.
18 Id.; for additional information on USERRA and its history, see Rogers v. City
of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 762-69 (5th Cir. 2004); Konrad S. Lee, When Johnny
Comes Marching Home Again Will He Be Welcome at Work?, 35 PEP . L. REv. 247,
252-59 (2008).
t9 Carder, 636 F.3d at 177-78.
20 Id. at 179 (quoting Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1998)).
21 Id. at 175-76.
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states that a service member "'shall not be denied.., any benefit
of employment by an employer"' because of his or her military
status.22 Section 4303(2) defines "benefit of employment" as
"'any advantage, profit, privilege, gain, status, account, or inter-
est (including wages or salary for work performed) that accrues
by reason of an employment contract or agreement or an em-
ployer policy, plan, or practice. ' ' 23 Finally, § 4301 (a) (1)-(3)
lists the three purposes of the statute: to encourage service in
the reserves, to minimize disruption to the lives of military ser-
vice members and their employers by providing prompt reem-
ployment, and to prohibit discrimination against persons
because of their military service.24
According to the Fifth Circuit, while the term "benefit of em-
ployment" used in § 4311(a) and defined in § 4303(2) does not
include any express reference to "harassment, hostility, insults,
derision, derogatory comments, or any other similar words," the
statute's clear ban on discrimination against service members in
§ 4301 (a) (3) required the court to go outside the plain mean-
ing of the statute and consider next Congress's legislative in-
tent.2 5 The court acknowledged that USERRA's legislative
history commanded the statute to be broadly construed in favor
of service members and that an administrative body, the Merit
Systems Protection Board (MSPB), had placed great weight on
the legislative history in determining that USERRA provides a
hostile work environment claim.2a However, the court deter-
mined that this was not enough to decide the issue, particularly
since the MSPB's decision was not binding.27 Instead, the court
looked to case law interpreting other antidiscrimination stat-
utes.28 When the Supreme Court allowed the first claim for a
hostile work environment in 1986 under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act (Title VII) in Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, the
Court relied on "language prohibiting discrimination with re-
spect to the 'terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,'" with
particular emphasis on the word "conditions. ' 29 The use of the
22 Id. at 175 (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4311(a) (2006)).
23 Id. (quoting 38 U.S.C. § 4303(2) (2006)).
24 Id. at 175-76 (citing 38 U.S.C. § 4301 (a)(1)-(3)).
25 Id. at 176.
26 Id. at 176-77; see Petersen v. Dep't of Interior, 71 M.S.P.B. 227, 239 (1996).
27 See Carder, 636 F.3d at 176 & n.3, 177, 181 & n.9.
28 Id. at 177-78.
29 Id. at 177 (emphasis added) (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57, 63-66 (1986)).
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same or similar phrase in the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA) and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act pro-
vided the source for hostile work environment claims under
these statutes.3 0 While Title IX of the Education Amendments
of 1972 and the Rehabilitation Act of 1974 lack the specific lan-
guage, the court noted that these were passed before the Su-
preme Court's decision in Meritor and have been interpreted in
conjunction with a companion statute (either Title VII or the
ADA) that includes the specific language.3 1 Thus, the court
found that because USERRA was passed after the Supreme
Court had interpreted the language in Title VII and the ADA,
Congress necessarily intended to exclude a hostile work environ-
ment claim under USERRA when it used the term "benefits of
employment" instead of "terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment."3 2
The court next found that the policies and goals of USERRA
differed drastically from other antidiscrimination statutes:"
The court stated that the primary purpose of USERRA is to "en-
courage people to join the reserves" rather than prohibit dis-
crimination based on military service since "[t]here is simply
'little evidence that employers harbor a negative stereotype
about military service or that Congress believes they do.'-'M The
court used the conclusion that USERRA was not intended to re-
solve a "widespread social problem" of discrimination against
historically disadvantaged groups to distinguish it from Title
VII.3 5 The court also noted that the Department of Labor
(DOL) regulations implementing USERRA make no mention of
harassment or hostile work environment claims-in contrast to
the guidelines issued by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, which defined harassment as a form of discrimina-
tion prohibited by Title VII.36 The court rejected the policy ar-
30 Id. at 178 & n.5.
31 Id. at 180 & n.8.
32 Id. at 178.
33 See id. at 179.
34 Id. (quoting Velasquez v. Frapwell, 160 F.3d 389, 392 (7th Cir. 1998)).
35 Id.
36 Id. at 181. However, the DOL recently issued a report making clear its inten-
tion for USERRA to include hostile work environment claims. Reply to Respon-
dent's Brief in Opposition at *6, Carder, 636 F.3d 172 (No. 10-1546), 2011 WLT
3978768 (citing VETERANS' EMP'T AND TRAINING, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, USERRA
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gument that USERRA's express purpose of protecting service
members from discrimination could be circumvented if the
claim for a hostile work environment were unavailable, reason-
ing that service members would still have a claim for construc-
tive discharge if they were forced to quit due to the
harassment.37
The Fifth Circuit erred in concluding that USERRA does not
allow a hostile work environment claim when it dismissed the
legislative intent to broadly interpret the language of the statute.
Although not mandatory authority, the MSPB's decision in Peter-
sen v. Department of the Interior provides strong guidance on the
issue of legislative intent. Petersen cites the legislative record for
the proposition that Congress "intends . . . [for the] anti-dis-
crimination provisions [to] be broadly construed and strictly en-
forced." ' Furthermore, the list of "benefits of employment"
included in the statute "is illustrative and not intended to be all
inclusive."39 The legislative history makes it clear that Congress
did indeed intend a broad interpretation of the term "benefit of
employment." Considered in light of the statute's policy to pro-
tect service members from discrimination, this should include
freedom from workplace harassment and would allow a claim
for a hostile work environment.
The Fifth Circuit's conclusion that USERRA provides no hos-
tile work environment claim ignores the language expressly stat-
ing the statutory purposes to encourage enlistment in the
military reserves and protect service members from discrimina-
tion by their employers. The court held that USERRA's purpose
was not frustrated or circumvented because service members po-
tentially have a claim for constructive discharge if they are
forced to quit due to harassment.40 Yet this line of reasoning
does not achieve either of USERRA's express purposes. If an
employee knows he or she could be subject to harassment in the
workplace, he or she will be less likely to enlist in the reserves,
frustrating the statute's first purpose.4 Furthermore, if employ-
ees have no means of redress against their employers for harass-
ment due to their military obligations, the statute fails to protect
37 Carder, 636 F.3d at 181.
38 Petersen v. Dep't of Interior, 71 M.S.P.B. 227, 236 (1996) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 103-65, pt. 1, at 21 (1993)).
39 Id.
40 Carder, 636 F.3d at 181.
41 See Lee, supra note 18, at 276-77.
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service members from discrimination.4 2 Given that the legisla-
ture clearly directed that USERRA be interpreted broadly in
favor of the service member, this outcome cannot be intended.
Supreme Court precedent supports this argument because case
law has consistently found that the term discrimination encom-
passes harassment." The important commonality among the
antidiscrimination statutes is that they allow a hostile work envi-
ronment claim, not that they use the same exact language.44
The Fifth Circuit's attempt to distinguish USERRA from Title
VII based on the different policy goals and beneficiaries of the
statutes is improper. The court states that, unlike antidis-
crimination statutes designed to prevent harassment of histori-
cally disadvantaged minorities in need of special protection,
Congress had no similar purpose in USERRA.4 5 However, this
argument clearly fails when considering the history of USERRA
and its predecessors, which provided protection to military ser-
vice members for over fifty years.46 One of USERRA's express
purposes is to protect military service members from discrimina-
tion due to their military obligations.47 Although service mem-
bers can potentially be distinguished from historically
disadvantaged groups due to their "choice" to join the group,
this distinction is not meaningful. Instead, service members are
disadvantaged in the workplace due to their military obligations
requiring them to be absent from work more frequently than
nonservice members and have been subject to retaliation and
hostility from employers.4 It is precisely because this group is in
need of special protections that Congress passed this legislation.
After the Fifth Circuit's decision that a hostile work environ-
ment claim does not exist under USERRA, the service members
petitioned for a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court on
June 17, 2011 to decide the issue and give guidance to the lower
courts.49 The Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 3,
2011.50
42 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9, at *17-18.
43 Reply to Respondent's Brief in Opposition, supra note 36, at *10-11.
44 Petersen, 71 M.S.P.B. at 237-39.
45 Carder, 636 F.3d at 179.
46 Rogers v. City of San Antonio, 392 F.3d 758, 762 (5th Cir. 2004).
47 38 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2006).
48 See Rogers, 392 F.3d at 764-65.
49 See generally Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 9.
50 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari Denied, Carder, 636 F.3d 172 (No. 10-
1546), 2011 WL 4536541.
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The high proportion of commercial airline pilots who are vet-
erans or reservists means the Fifth Circuit's recent decision has a
significant impact on the airline industry. Given the practical
effects of the court's decision, and the Fifth Circuit's errors in
overlooking the express purpose of the statute to protect service
members from discrimination and evidence of legislative intent
to provide broad protections to military service members, courts
in other circuits should diverge from the Fifth Circuit and allow
a hostile work environment claim under USERRA.
